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FIRST CIRCUIT
United States v. Caraballo, 552 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 2008)
QUESTION: Whether the Sentencing Commission’s 2007
amendment to the drug quantity table offers a remedy to a defendant
who, “although convicted of a drug-trafficking offense involving crack
cocaine, was ultimately sentenced as a career offender.” Id. at 7.
ANALYSIS: The court recognized that Amendment 706 of the
Sentencing Guidelines “adjusts downward by two levels the base offense
level ascribed to various quantities of crack cocaine . . . thereby
shrinking the guideline disparity between crack cocaine offenses and
powdered cocaine offenses.” Id. at 9. However, because Defendant was a
career offender, his sentence fell under an alternate sentencing table as
well. Id. at 8. “If the offense level for a career offender . . . is greater than
the offense level otherwise applicable, the offense level from the [career
offender] table . . . shall apply.” Id. at 9–10.
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit rejected Defendant’s argument that
Amendment 706 lowered his actual sentencing range and held that his
“actual sentencing range was produced by [the career offender
guideline].” Id. at 11.
Fantini v. Salem State College, 557 F.3d 22 (1st Cir. 2009)
QUESTION: “[W]hether Title VII by including in the definition of
employer, ‘any agent of such a person,’ intended for said ‘agents’ to be
subject to liability for engaging in proscribed discriminatory acts?” Id. at
29.
ANALYSIS: The 1st Circuit had declined in previous cases to
discuss this issue; however it noted that the majority of circuits hold that
agents cannot be held personally liable under Title VII. Id. The court
quoted the 9th Circuit’s decision in Miller v. Maxwell’s Intern. Inc.,
which states that the “statutory scheme itself indicates that Congress did
not intend to impose individual liability on employees.” Id. The 1st
Circuit joined the reasoning of the 7th Circuit in holding that the “1991
amendments to Title VII further bolster our conclusion that individuals
are not liable under that Act” because the amendments made no
reference to the amount of damages an individual would be accountable.
Id. at 30–31.
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CONCLUSION: Thus, the 1st Circuit was persuaded by its sister
circuits and concluded that “there is no individual employee liability
under Title VII.” Id. at 31.
Mejia-Rodriguez v. Holder, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 3718 (1st Cir. Feb.
25, 2009)
QUESTION: Whether “the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”)
erred in finding that (1) [petitioner] was not eligible for an exception to
the inadmissibility rules for those who have committed certain crimes
and that (2) he was ineligible for discretionary relief from removal by the
Attorney General. The petition does involve one issue which this court
has not addressed before: whether the term ‘maximum penalty possible,’
under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II), is determined by the federal
Sentencing Guidelines range or the relevant statutory range of
imprisonment.” Id. at *1–2.
ANALYSIS: The Court noted that 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II)
“makes no reference to the Sentencing Guidelines. The language of the
statute plainly refers to the ‘maximum penalty possible’ and that
maximum is set by statute. That maximum possible punishment is for
‘the crime of which the alien was convicted,’ a reference again to the
statute of conviction.” Id. at *8.
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit held that “the term ‘maximum
penalty possible’ is determined in reference to the relevant statutory
range of imprisonment and not the federal Sentencing Guidelines range.”
Id. at *1–2.
Segarra-Miranda v. Acosta-Rivera, 557 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2009)
QUESTION: Whether, under the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (“BAPCPA”) the bankruptcy court
may enter an order excusing non-disclosure after the time for filing the
required information has expired. Id. at 9.
ANALYSIS: The court reviewed the automatic dismissal provision
of BAPCPA, which states that “when a debtor fails to file all the
information required by section 521(a)(1)(B) within the prescribed
period of” 45 days, “the case shall be automatically dismissed.” Id. at 10.
However, the court considered the term “automatic” a misnomer because
the dismissal only takes place at the insistence of a party in interest. Id. at
12. The court looked to 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(B), which provides that
the debtor “‘shall . . . file’” the required disclosures “unless the court
orders otherwise.” Id. at 14. The court found that because the bankruptcy
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court had the flexibility to waive non-disclosure before the passage of
BAPCPA and considering that BAPCPA did not expressly curtail that
power, the bankruptcy court can use its discretion to excuse detailed
disclosure and determine when such information becomes “irrelevant or
extraneous.” Id. at 12. The court noted that a grant of judicial power to
“order otherwise” predated BAPCPA, and when Congress updated
section 521 it left that language intact. Id. at 12.
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit held, “that the great divide in section
521 is between information that is required and information that is
not. . . . The [BAPCPA] allows courts to do the sifting suggested by that
divide without rigid adherence to the forty-five-day deadline.” Id.
Northeastern Land Servs. v. NLRB, No. 08-1878, 2009 U.S. App.
LEXIS 5267 (1st Cir. Mar. 13, 2009)
QUESTION: Whether a two-member panel of the National Labor
Relations Board (“Board”) constitutes a quorum under Section 3(b) of
the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 153(b). Id. at *2.
ANALYSIS: The court first indicated that the Board can lawfully
delegate its power to a two-member panel pursuant to the “plain text” of
Section 3(b). Id. at *12–13. The court noted that the statute authorizes
the Board to delegate its power to a three-member panel. Id. at *13. The
court then observed that Section 3(b) specifically provides that any
Board vacancy “shall not impair the right of the remaining members to
exercise all of the powers of the Board.” Id. The court thus recognized
that a vacancy in a three-member panel cannot impair the right of the
remaining two members to exercise the full powers of the Board. Id.
CONCLUSION: The court concluded that a two-member panel of the
Board constitutes a quorum. Id.

SECOND CIRCUIT
In re County of Erie, 546 F.3d 222 (2d Cir. 2008)
QUESTION: Whether “communications passing between a
government attorney without policy-making authority and a public
official are protected by the attorney-client privilege when the
communications evaluate the policies’ legality and propose alternatives.”
Id. at 225.
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ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that “[c]ourts have found waiver by
implication when a client testifies concerning portions of the attorneyclient communication, when a client places the attorney-client
relationship directly at issue, and when a client asserts reliance on an
attorney’s advice as an element of a claim or defense.” Id. at 228. The
court noted that the key to finding implied waiver in the third scenario is
“some showing by the party arguing for a waiver that the opposing party
relies on the privileged communication as a claim or defense or as an
element of a claim or defense.” Id. The court further reasoned that the
notion of unfairness underlies any determination that a privilege should
be forfeited. Id. at 229.
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that communications between
a government attorney and a public official are not protected by the
attorney-client privilege when the party asserting the privilege has relied
on the advice of his counsel to make his claim or defense. Id. at 229.
Overbaugh v. Household Bank N.A. (In re Overbaugh), 2009 U.S.
App. LEXIS 5101 (2d Cir. Mar. 11, 2009)
QUESTION: Whether a Chapter 13 trustee has standing to object to
a motion to reclassify a claim from secured to un-secured. Id. at *12.
ANALYSIS: The 2nd Circuit determined that because 11 U.S.C. §
1302 requires a trustee to properly disburse all claims, “a trustee has
standing to object to the motion of a debtor to reclassify a secured
creditor’s claims.” Id. The court then reasoned that “[b]ecause a trustee
must be able to verify that secured claims are, in fact, secured, it
necessarily follows that a trustee has standing to object when a debtor
attempts to reclassify a secured claim as an unsecured claim.” Id.
Following the approach taken by the 5th and 9th Circuits, the 2nd Circuit
found that “when considering similar challenges to the authority of a
Chapter 13 trustee, that the primary purpose of the Chapter 13 trustee is
not just to serve the interests of the unsecured creditors, but rather, to
serve the interests of all creditors.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that “a Chapter 13 trustee—
who is charged with assuring that claims are properly disbursed [under]
11 U.S.C. § 1302(b)(3)—has standing to object to a motion to reclassify
a claim.” Id. at *3.
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THIRD CIRCUIT
United States v. Grape, 549 F.3d 591 (3d Cir. 2008)
QUESTION: Whether the appropriate standard of review for
appealing the first two factors of a Sell order to involuntarily medicate a
defendant to render him competent for trial is de novo or clear error
review. Id. at 598.
ANALYSIS: The 3rd Circuit noted that their “sister circuits have
specified standards of review for each factor of the Sell test.” Id. In
accordance with their sister circuits, the 3rd Circuit agreed that the first
factor of a Sell order, “whether the Government has advanced
sufficiently important interests to justify forcible medication,” presents a
legal question subject to de novo review. Id. The 3rd Circuit stated that
the second factor of a Sell order, “whether involuntary medication is
substantially likely to restore Grape to competency,” is a factual question
subject to clear error review. Id. The court reasoned that “[d]etermining
whether involuntary medication will significantly further [the proffered]
state interests, including the medication’s likely effect on a defendant
and his ability to stand trial and help prepare for it, requires us to resolve
a factual question.” Id. Furthermore, the court held that the “Government
bears the burden of proof on factual questions by clear and convincing
evidence.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that “[b]ecause we agree that
the first issue presents a legal question, we will review the first Sell
factor . . . de novo” and because the second factor presents a factual
question, “[w]e therefore review the second Sell factor for clear error.”
Id.
Johnson v. Tennis, 549 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 2008)
QUESTION: Whether the rule of Bruton v. United States, holding
that in a joint criminal jury trial, “a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right
of confrontation is violated by admitting a confession of a non-testifying
codefendant that implicates the defendant, regardless of any limiting
instruction given to the jury,” applies to “the incriminating confession of
a non-testifying codefendant in a joint bench trial.” Id. at 298.
ANALYSIS: The court noted that Bruton was concerned with the
“limitations of a jury that it would or could not follow instructions to
disregard the prejudicial statements of a codefendant at a joint trial.” Id.
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at 299. The court recognized that the “the risks inherent in the jury
system of which the Bruton Court was so concerned would seemingly
not exist when a judge is sitting as a trier of fact.” Id. The court further
noted that the Supreme Court’s “stated rationale . . . limited [the rule’s]
application only to jury trials in criminal cases.” Id. at 300. The court
observed that other appellate courts have addressed the scope of Bruton
and limited the rule’s application to jury trials. Id.
CONCLUSION: The court concluded that the “Bruton rule . . .
applies solely to jury trials” and is thus “inapplicable to the incriminating
confession of a non-testifying codefendant in a joint bench trial.” Id.
Shubert v. Lucent Tech, Inc. (In re Winstar Communs., Inc.) 554 F.3d
382 (3d Cir. 2009)
QUESTION: Whether “a creditor can be considered a nonstatutory insider for purposes of extending the time for recovery of
preferential payments” under the Bankruptcy Code when the insider does
not have actual control. Id. at 388, 396.
ANALYSIS: The 3rd Circuit rejected the appellant’s contention that
“in order for a creditor to constitute an insider [that creditor] . . . must
exercise actual managerial control over the debtor’s day to day
operations.” Id. at 395. The court stated that instead of control, the
relevant legal inquiry “is whether there is a close relationship [between
the debtor and creditor] and . . . anything other than closeness to suggest
that any transactions were not conducted at arm’s length.” Id. at 396.
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit concluded that it is “not necessary
that a non-statutory insider have actual control” for purposes of
extending the time for recovery of preferential payments under the
Bankruptcy Code. Id.

FOURTH CIRCUIT
Hutson v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (In re Nat’l Gas Distribs.,
LLC), 556 F.3d 247 (4th Cir. 2009)
QUESTION: Whether commodity forward agreements must be
traded on exchanges or in financial markets. Id. at 255.
ANALYSIS: The 4th Circuit first noted that the word “agreement” is
a more general term than “contract,” and thus every contract is an
agreement, but not every agreement is a contract. Id. Further, since
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forward contracts need not be traded on exchanges or in financial
markets, it follows that some forward agreements need not be traded on
exchanges or in financial markets. Id. at 256–57.
CONCLUSION: The 4th Circuit thus held that commodity forward
agreements do not need to be traded on exchanges or in financial
markets. Id. at 257.
Palisades Collections L.L.C. v. Shorts, 552 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 2008)
QUESTION: “[W]hether a party joined as a defendant to a
counterclaim (the ‘additional counter-defendant’) may remove [a] case to
federal court solely because the counterclaim satisfies the jurisdictional
requirements of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”).” Id. at
328.
ANALYSIS: The 4th Circuit first noted that the general removal
statute, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441, only permits “the defendant or defendants”
to remove a case to federal court. Id. at 331. The court further observed
that CAFA conferred federal jurisdiction over civil actions in which the
“matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000.” Id. The
4th Circuit examined the Supreme Court’s decision in Shamrock Oil,
where the Supreme Court held that the original plaintiff was not
authorized to remove a case to federal court. Id. at 332–33. Other courts,
the 4th Circuit noted, have interpreted Shamrock Oil to mean that only
the original defendants in a suit may file removal. Id. The 4th Circuit
then agreed with the 6th Circuit’s reasoning that the wording in section
1441, stating “defendant or defendants,” refers only to the original
parties against whom the original plaintiff asserted the claim, and not to
third-party defendants. Id. Furthermore, the 4th Circuit reasoned that if
Congress had intended to allow additional counter-defendants to remove
a case to federal court, then it would have so indicated in the statute. Id.
at 333–34.
CONCLUSION: The 4th Circuit thus held that additional counterdefendants may not remove a case to federal court. Id. at 328–29.
United States v. Wofford, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 3519 (5th Cir. Feb.
18, 2009)
QUESTION: Whether an employee retirement pension plan (“plan”)
that fails to satisfy the requirements of § 401(a) for qualification at the
relevant times is still a plan “subject to any provision of Title I” of
ERISA for the purposes of § 664. Id. at *15.

2009]

First Impressions

381

ANALYSIS: The court noted that they previously held in the
bankruptcy context that a plan’s failure to remain tax qualified does not
render ERISA’s Title I anti-alienation provisions inapplicable. Id. at *15.
The court also reviewed another prior decision where the court held that
tax qualification is not a prerequisite to ERISA qualification. Id. at *17–
18. Reviewing that earlier decision, the court noted that “[n]owhere in
ERISA . . . is there a requirement that, to be an ERISA plan and thus be
governed by ERISA, a plan must be tax qualified.” Id. at *19.
CONCLUSION: The court found that given the earlier precedents in
the bankruptcy context, the district court correctly deemed tax
qualification irrelevant to the issue of whether a plan was subject to any
provision of Title I of ERISA. Id. at *22.
Castellanos-Contreras v. Decatur Hotels LLC, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS
4796 (5th Cir. Feb. 11, 2009)
QUESTION: Whether, under the Fair Labor Standards Act
(“FLSA”), “an employer must reimburse guest workers for (1)
recruitment expenses, (2) transportation expenses, or (3) visa expenses,
which the guest workers incurred before relocating to the employer's
location.” Id. at *3.
ANALYSIS: The 5th Circuit first noted that an employer must
reimburse employees for “kick-backs.” Id. at *13–14. Further, a
necessary condition of a “kick-back” is that it is primarily for the benefit
of the employer. Id. at *14. Thus, finding that neither recruitment
expenses, transportation expenses, nor visa expenses are primarily for the
benefit of the employer, the court did not consider those expenses to be
“kick-backs” and as such did not need to be reimbursed by the employer.
Id. at *15–24.
CONCLUSION: The court held that the FLSA does not require an
employer to “reimburse its guest workers for the recruitment fees,
transportation costs, or visa fees that they incurred before relocating to
the United States.” Id. at *24.

SIXTH CIRCUIT
LPP Mortgage, Ltd. v. Brinley, 547 F.3d 643 (6th Cir. 2008)
QUESTION: Whether, in bankruptcy cases, technical abandonment
of property of the estate under 11 U.S.C. § 544 is revocable. Id. at 648.
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ANALYSIS: The 6th Circuit agreed with the limited discretion
approach, that courts should have limited discretion in determining when
technical abandonment can be revoked, that was taken by the bankruptcy
court. Id. at 649 (noting the bankruptcy court’s reliance on the 10th
Circuit’s decision in In re Woods, 173 F.3d 770 (10th Cir. 1999)). The
court found that “the question of whether abandonment is revocable is to
be determined by applying the guidelines of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b), made applicable to bankruptcy matters by Federal Rule
of Bankruptcy Procedure 9024.” Id. The court concurred with the
bankruptcy court’s finding that this approach promoted finality, debtor
protection, due diligence, and flexibility. Id.
CONCLUSION: The court held that technical abandonment is
revocable, finding that “[t]he application of Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) strikes
the appropriate balance between promoting finality and allowing courts
to grant relief in limited circumstances.” Id.
Groeneveld Transport Efficiency v. Eisses, 297 Fed. Appx. 508 (6th
Cir. Oct. 20, 2008)
QUESTION: Whether the plaintiffs may appeal the district court’s
order, which temporarily stayed the district court action based on the
doctrine of international abstention. Id. at 510.
ANALYSIS: The 6th Circuit agreed with the 8th Circuit and held
that a stay based on international abstention is not a final order. Id. The
court relied on the 8th Circuit’s reasoning that since there was a lack of
complete overlap in the U.S. and foreign litigation, and because the
district court explicitly contemplated the possibility for further litigation
in the U.S., the district court’s order was not final. Id. The court noted
that in issuing its ruling, “the district court was not attempting to dispose
of the case. Rather, recognizing the difficulty of trying a case with
substantially similar parties and similar disputes in two fora, the district
court decided to temporarily stay the action while the Canadian case
proceeded.” Id. at 511. Thus, the court concluded that the district court’s
stay cannot be considered a final order because the district court clearly
based its ruling on the international abstention doctrine; and because the
district court asked the plaintiffs to instruct the district court on whether
the action should be “fully restored” in federal court after foreign
resolution. Id.
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit concluded that a stay based on
international abstention is not a final order.
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Redmon v. Sud-Chemie Inc. Ret. Plan for Union Employees., 547 F.3d
531 (6th Cir. 2008)
QUESTION: Whether the “Kentucky statute of limitations is most
analogous to a claim for benefits under [29 U.S.C.] §1132(a)(1)(B)” of
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”). Id. at 536
n.8.
ANALYSIS: The 6th Circuit noted that since ERISA “does not
provide a statute of limitations for a claim of benefits under
§1132(a)(1)(B) . . . the court [will] apply the most analogous state law
statute of limitations.” Id. at 534. The court stated that a statute of
limitations for breach of contract is most analogous where “no provision
comparable to KRS §413.120(2) [the statutory liability provision] was
before the court.” Id. at 535. However, the court explained that since
appellant claimed that signature of waiver on the Designation of Form of
Benefit Payments (“DFBP”) was obtained in violation of ERISA, this
cause of action did not arise from an independent contract but “more
specifically from ERISA’s statutory provisions.” Id. at 537. Therefore,
the court recognized that KRS §413.120(2), which affixes a five-year
statute of limitations, was applicable to defendant’s claim, not the state
statute of limitations for breach of contract. Id.
The court further reasoned that this finding was in accord with
Kentucky case law, which held that KRS §413.120(2) was appropriate
where a statute creates a new theory of liability unknown at common law
such as the Worker’s Compensation scheme. Id. Because “ERISA is
more akin to a statutory scheme such as Workers’ Compensation than to
any common law cause of action,” the court found that the statutory
liability provision [of Kentucky law] is the most analogous statute of
limitations” for this claim. Id. at 538.
CONCLUSION: The court held that KRS §413.120(2), the five-year
statute of limitations, is the most analogous statute of limitations for a
claim of benefits under [29 U.S.C.S.] §1132(a)(1)(B) ERISA. Id. at 537.
Pickens v. Howes, 549 F.3d 377 (6th Cir. 2008)
QUESTION: Whether a defendant who pleads to an illegal sentence
should be allowed to withdraw his plea even if a new sentence is ordered
which is “both legal and gives him the entire benefit of the original plea.”
Id. at 381.
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ANALYSIS: Generally, a defendant may withdraw a plea bargain
calling for an illegal sentence. Id. at 381. “The court found that
defendant’s Due Process rights were not violated when the illegal
sentence was modified to comply with both the law and the sentencing
terms of the plea agreement.” Id. Allowing the defendant to withdraw his
plea and requiring the state to retry the case would have been both
unnecessary and unfair. Id. at 381–82.
CONCLUSION: “[W]hen a sentence is modified to make it
consistent with state law and to give the defendant the benefit of his
original plea agreement, the Constitution does not require the withdrawal
of a once-illegal plea.” Id.
United States v. Sanders, 301 Fed. Appx. 503 (6th Cir. Nov. 24, 2008)
QUESTION: Whether “aggravated riot,” an offense not specifically
identified as a crime of violence under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines,
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a), can be considered a violent offense for the purposes
of sentencing enhancement. Id. at 506.
ANALYSIS: After reviewing the statutory language at issue, the
court recognized “that offenses that qualify as ‘aggravated riot’ in Ohio
[do not] necessarily qualify as ‘crimes of violence’ under U.S.S.G. §
4B1.2(a)(1).” Id. The court then considered “whether aggravated riot is a
crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) because it ‘presents a
serious potential risk of physical injury to another.’” Id. In considering
this question, the court recognized “that the relevant inquiry must focus
‘on whether the conduct encompassed by the elements of the offense, in
the ordinary case, presents a serious potential risk of injury to another.’”
Id. 507. “Because the statute in question here contains elements that
expressly distinguish conduct with a risk of violence under [the Ohio
statute] subsections (A)(2) and (3) from other kinds of disorderly conduct
committed in the course of non-violent felonies under subsection (A)(1),
aggravated riot does not appear to be a crime of violence in all cases.” Id.
The court recognized that it was “not restricted to a mere examination of
the statutory language but [it was] permitted to look at the charging
documents and jury instructions to determine the actual elements of the
crime committed.” Id. at *11. The court opined that “the language of the
indictment is identical to the statutory language, revealing that [the
defendant’s] prior conviction was undoubtedly for a violation of either
subsection (A)(2) or (A)(3) of the Ohio aggravated-riot statue, both of
which are crimes of violence . . . .” Id.
CONCLUSION: “Although ‘aggravated riot’ is not necessarily a
crime of violence pursuant to statutory language alone, [the court’s]
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review of [the defendant’s] indictment establishe[d] that he was charged
and convicted of an offense that, under a subsection of Ohio’s aggravated
riot statute, constitutes a crime of violence for federal sentencing
purposes.” Id.
Answers in Genesis of Ky., Inc. v. Creation Ministries Int’l, Ltd., 556
F.3d 459 (6th Cir. 2009)
QUESTION: Whether a federal court should abstain from exercising
jurisdiction over a motion to compel arbitration because of international
comity concerns. Id. at 465.
ANALYSIS: The 6th Circuit looked to the Supreme Court’s holding
in Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States to
determine the proper factors to consider when making the decision to
abstain from exercising jurisdiction when international comity is a
concern. Id. at 467. In Colorado River, the Supreme Court noted that the
most important factor in an abstention decision is “whether there exists a
‘clear federal policy evince[ing] . . . the avoidance of piecemeal
adjudication.’” Id. “How far the parallel proceeding has advanced in the
other sovereign’s courts, the number of defendants and complexity of the
proceeding, the convenience of the parties, and whether a foreign
sovereign is participating in the suit” were other factors considered by
the Supreme Court. Id. The 6th Circuit noted that the Federal Arbitration
Act (“FAA”), which applies to the dispute between the parties, did not
promote the avoidance of piecemeal adjudication. Id. 468. In fact, the
FAA recognized that piecemeal adjudication may be necessary to
“‘enforce private agreements into which parties had entered.’” Id.
Further, the court noted that the foreign litigation was only in the
beginning stages and convenience is not a factor because the parties are
located in two different countries to begin with so either location will be
inconvenient for half of the parties involved. Id. 469.
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held that it would not abstain from
exercising jurisdiction over a motion to compel arbitration because of
international comity concerns after carefully considering the factors laid
out by the Supreme Court in Colorado River. Id.
United States v. Shafer, 557 F.3d 440 (6th Cir. Mar. 3, 2009)
QUESTION: Whether the term “sexual contact” in 18 U.S.C. §
2246(3) includes self-masturbation. Id. at 444.
ANALYSIS: The 6th Circuit emphasized that “a matter requiring
statutory interpretation is a question of law requiring de novo review, and
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the starting point for interpretation is the language of the statute itself.”
Id. at 445. The court pointed out that absent clear legislative intent to the
contrary, the statutory wording is generally conclusive. Id. Section
2246(3) defines “sexual contact” as “the intentional touching . . . of any
person . . . .” Id. Given the definition, the court found that the text of
section 2246(3) does not support a holding that more than one person is
required for “sexual contact” to occur. However, the court said that
“simply because the statute does not specifically state that selfmasturbation qualifies as ‘sexual contact’ does not mean that Congress
intended for such an act to be excluded, especially when selfmasturbation falls squarely within the plain language of [section]
2246(3).” Id. at 445–46.
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held that a clear reading of section
2246(3) requires a holding “that ‘sexual contact,’ as defined by [section]
2246(3), includes self-masturbation.” Id. at 446.

SEVENTH CIRCUIT
Jimenez v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 2008)
QUESTION: Whether criminal recklessness constitutes a crime of
violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b). Id. at 558.
ANALYSIS: The court recognized that the Supreme Court, after
examining the scope of section 16(b) and holding that a conviction for
drunk driving did not constitute a crime of violence, reasoned that
accidental or negligent conduct should not fall under the definition of a
crime of violence. Id. at 560. The court then recognized that five other
circuits (the 3rd, 4th, 6th, 9th, and 10th) have held that reckless crimes
cannot be crimes of violence under section 16(b). Id. The court adopted
the 3rd Circuit’s interpretation of the Supreme Court’s ruling that the
concept of physical force necessary to constitute a crime of violence
“naturally suggests a higher degree of intent than negligent or merely
accidental conduct.” Id. In the present case, the crime of criminal
recklessness in Indiana for which the respondent was convicted
encompasses both accidental and aggressive conduct. It therefore is not a
crime of violence which requires a higher level of “intent to use force”
than criminal recklessness requires. Id. at 562.
CONCLUSION: The 7th Circuit joined its sister circuits in holding
that reckless crimes are not crimes of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b).
Id. at 560.
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EIGHTH CIRCUIT
UnitedHealth Group Inc. v. Wilmington Trust Co., 548 F.3d 1124 (8th
Cir. 2008)
QUESTION: Whether the plain language of Section 504(i) of the
indenture in question, or the manifest purposes of the parties “imposes an
independent obligation on the company to file timely SEC reports . . .
and within fifteen days afterwards, to forward copies of such reports to
the trustee.” Id. at 1128.
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that “the plain language of
[section] 504(i) makes clear that any duty actually to file the reports is
imposed ‘pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Exchange Act’ and not
pursuant to the indenture itself,” and thus the “provision does not
incorporate the Exchange Act,” but “merely refers to it in order to
establish which reports must be forwarded.” Id. at 1128–29. The court
rejected the argument that the purpose of the provision was to impose an
independent filing obligation. Id. at 1130.
The court noted that the “clear and unambiguous language of the
indenture provision” at issue imposed nothing more than the ministerial
duty to forward copies of certain reports . . . within fifteen days of
actually filing the reports with the SEC.” Id. at 1130.
CONCLUSION: The 8th Circuit thus held that “[b]ased on the plain
meaning of [section] 504(i) . . . the indenture imposes no independent
obligation to file timely SEC reports.” Id.
H&R Block, Inc., v. Am. Int’l Specialty Lines Ins. Co., 546 F.3d 937
(8th Cir. 2008)
QUESTION: “[W]hether class actions filed against nationwide tax
preparer H&R Block (‘Block’) asserting a variety of statutory and
common law claims arising out of Block’s Refund Anticipation Loan
(“RAL”) program are excluded from ‘prior acts’ coverage under
professional liability ‘claims made’ insurance policies because other
class actions asserting similar claims were filed prior to the policy
periods.” Id. at 938.
ANALYSIS: The 8th Circuit noted that “the very purpose of
insurance is to protect against the risk of unknown but not unexpected
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loss.” Id. at 941. The court indicated that the provisions at issue
provided coverage for “‘claims based on a wrongful act that occurred
before the effective date of the policy’” as long as the insurer “‘had no
knowledge of the prior wrongful act on the effective date’” of the policy,
“nor any reasonable way to foresee that a claim might be brought.” Id. at
942. The court stated that in order for plaintiffs to have class action
standing, they “must allege and undertake to prove that each class
member was injured by the same wrongful act or acts.” Id. The court
further found that when a service is sold nationwide, claims premised on
the RAL program put the insurer on “reasonable notice that other clients
will assert the same claims alleging that the same ‘wrongful acts’
infected their individual transactions.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 8th Circuit held that where class action lawsuits
have already been filed against the insured for prior acts, and before the
policy periods begin, these suits give the insured both the required
knowledge of its prior wrongful acts as well as a reasonable opportunity
to foresee that such may be brought in the future. Id. at 943.
Solis v. Summit Contrs., Inc., 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 3755 (8th Cir.
Jan. 17, 2008)
QUESTION: Whether 29 C.F.R. § 1910.12(a) was unambiguous in
that it did not preclude OSHA from issuing citations to general
contractors when their subcontractors caused a condition exposing their
employees to danger. Id. at *16.
ANALYSIS: Summit argued that: “the regulation requires the
employer to protect only ‘his employees.’ Because creating employer,
correcting employer, and controlling employer citation policies permit
OSHA to issue citations to employers when their own employees are not
exposed to the hazard, Summit’s reading of § 1910.12(a) effectively
precludes these policies and only permits the exposing employer citation
policy. Although part (1) may support this interpretation, part (2) must
provide something different to avoid being superfluous to part (1).
Summit argues that part (2) requires the employer to protect only his
employees at their places of employment.” Id. at *22–23. The court
found that Summit’s position on 29 C.F.R. § 1910.12(a) presented two
problems: “First, Summit’s interpretation is contrary to the grammatical
construction of the sentence because it requires the term ‘each of his
employees’ to be the object of the sentence, rather than a prepositional
phrase that modifies the actual objects of the sentence. Second, Summit’s
interpretation would make the term ‘places of employment’ redundant of
the term ‘employment’ and, therefore, superfluous. Under Summit’s
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interpretation, part (2) provides nothing different from or in addition to
part (1); instead, it makes the term ‘places of employment’ a subset of
the term ‘employment.’” Id. at *23. The court further found that even if it
agreed with Summit’s position, it would have to defer to the Secretary’s
interpretation. Id. at *24.
CONCLUSION: The court held that the OSHRC’s finding that
OSHA could not fine general contractors under 29 C.F.R. § 1910.12(a)
for the acts of its subcontractors to be “contrary to law.” Id. at *37.

NINTH CIRCUIT
United States v. Weyhrauch, 548 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 2008)
QUESTION: “[W]hether a federal honest services mail fraud
prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1341 and § 1346 requires proof that the
conduct at issue also violated an applicable state law.” Id. at 1239.
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit first noted that the language of 18
U.S.C. § 1341 “criminalizes the use of the postal services in carrying out
a ‘scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by
means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representatives, or promises.’” Id.
at 1243. The court then stated that Congress clarified for purposes of
section 1341 that “the term ‘scheme or artifice to defraud’ includes a
scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest
services.” Id. However, the court acknowledged that Congress did not
define the concept of “honest services,” creating confusion over the
reach of section 1341. Id. The 9th Circuit declined to adopt the 5th
Circuit’s “‘state law limiting principle,’ which requires the government
to prove that a public official violated an independent state law to
support an honest services mail fraud conviction,” because prior case law
does not support the proposition that the federal fraud statute derives its
content solely from state law. Id. at 1243–45. Rather, the statutory text,
legislative history, and cases’ “[b]road characterization of . . . duty,
without reference to any underlying state law duty, suggests that public
officials’ duty of honesty is uniform rather than variable by state.” Id. at
1245–46. The court also noted that “[f]ederal action based on a valid
constitutional grant of authority is not improper simply because it
intrudes on state interests.” Id. at 1246.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit rejected the principle that a state law
violation is required for prosecution of federal honest services mail fraud
under 18 U.S.C. 1341 and ultimately recognized that the “two core
categories of conduct by public officials . . . that support an honest
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services conviction” [are] (1) taking a bribe or otherwise being paid for a
decision while purporting to be exercising independent discretion and (2)
nondisclosure of material information.” Id. at 1247.
Ahmed v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 768 (9th Cir. 2008)
QUESTION: Whether the Department of Homeland Security can
unilaterally block or veto a motion to reopen the proceedings for an
adjustment of immigration status in an immigration proceeding. Id. at
772.
ANALYSIS: The Board of Immigration Appeals initially denied the
plaintiff’s motion to reopen her immigration proceedings merely because
the Department of Homeland Security objected to it. Id. at 770. The court
found that the Department of Homeland Security does not have
automatic veto power when objecting to a motion to reopen immigration
proceedings. Id. at 772. Instead, the Board of Immigration Appeals may
consider the Department’s objection, but does not have to. Id.
CONCLUSION: When the Department of Homeland Security
opposes a motion to reopen immigration proceedings for adjustment of
status, the Board of Immigration Appeals may consider the objection, but
may not deny the motion based solely on the fact of the Department’s
objection. Id.
United States v. Contreras-Cisneros, 297 Fed. Appx. 659 (9th Cir.
2008)
QUESTION: Whether a double jeopardy claim can provide for an
exception to the rule permitting successive state and federal prosecutions.
Id. at 661.
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit emphasized that a “double jeopardy
claim must fail unless it falls within an exception to the rule permitting
successive state and federal prosecutions.” Id. The court pointed out that
although a state prosecution might serve the interests of the federal
government in maintaining secrecy in an ongoing DEA investigation,
“these circumstances do not justify the conclusion that the state
prosecution was ‘merely a tool of the federal authorities’ such that the
initial prosecution was ‘in essential fact another federal prosecution.’”
Id. The court added that the exception would not apply if “the state
remained an independent sovereign pursuing its own sovereign interests
throughout the state prosecution.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held “that in theory [a ‘tool’ or
‘cover’] exception does exist. As a practical matter, however . . . it is
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extremely difficult and highly unusual to prove that a prosecution by one
government is a tool, a sham, or a cover for the other government.” Id.
Delgado v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 2008)
QUESTION: Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B) grants the Attorney
General the authority to “determine a crime to be particularly serious
regardless of the penalty or its designation or non-designation as an
aggravated felony.” Id. at 1020.
ANALYSIS: The court began by noting that an alien is not eligible
for withholding of removal if the Attorney General determines the alien
committed a “particularly serious crime.” Id. at 1019–20. The court
explained that under § 1231(b)(3)(B) aggravated felonies are
“particularly serious crimes.” Id. at 1019. Although aggravated felonies
constitute “particularly serious crimes” per se, the court found that the
Attorney General is not precluded from deciding “on a case-by-case
basis, that any other crime is also ‘particularly serious.’” Id. at 1019,
1021. First, the court analyzed the legislative history of section
1231(b)(3)(B) and concluded that “[n]othing in the text or history . . .
suggests that Congress intended . . . to divest the Attorney General of his
authority to determine, on a case-by-case basis, that other crimes were
‘particularly serious,’ depending on the circumstances of [the alien’s]
commission, among other things.” Id. at 1021. Accordingly, the court
deferred to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), stating the
“BIA’s interpretation of the statute [was] reasonable.” Id. at 1022.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that the Attorney General has
“discretion to determine that, under the circumstances presented by an
individual case, a crime was ‘particularly serious,’ whether or not the
crime was an aggravated felony.” Id.
United States v. Blixt, 548 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2008)
QUESTION: “Whether the use of another’s signature constitutes a
“means of identification” for purposes of the Aggravated Identity Theft
statute,” codified as 18 U.S.C. § 1028A. Id. at 886.
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit considered the language of the statute to
determine whether a signature qualifies as a “means of identification.”
Id. at 887. The court noted the “Aggravated Identity Theft statute defines
the term ‘means of identification’ in a way that makes reasonably clear
that forging another’s signature on a check constitutes the use of a means
of identification.” Id. The court stated that the “definition includes the
use of a name, alone or in conjunction with any other information, as
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constituting the use of a means of identification so long as the
information taken as a whole identifies a specific individual.” Id. “By
using the word ‘any’ to qualify the term ‘name,’ the statute reflects
Congress’s intention to construct an expansive definition.” Id. The court
found that “categorically carving out a signature from this definition”
would “impermissibly narrow the definition of ‘name’ in the statute.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that “forging another’s
signature constitutes the use of that person’s name and thus qualifies as a
‘means of identification’ under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A.” Id. at 886.
Fones4all Corp. v. FCC, 550 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2008)
QUESTION: Whether the FCC may backdate an order explaining a
denial of a “petition for forbearance from the application of an FCC
regulation” to the date of an earlier press release announcing said
decision. Id. at 813.
ANALYSIS: The court interpreted 47 U.S.C. § 405 as requiring a
party challenging the FCC’s practice of backdating a Memorandum
Opinion in order to comply with the timeliness requirements of 47
U.S.C. § 160(c) to first present their argument to the Commission before
seeking judicial relief. Id. at 817. The court reasoned that the specific
language of 47 U.S.C. § 405 “explicitly mandate[s] that the FCC have
the ‘opportunity to pass’ on the merits of any challenges to its orders
before review may be sought in the Courts of Appeals.” Id. at 818. The
court noted that the D.C. Circuit had already “twice encountered a
similar set of facts involving backdating,” and in both cases held that the
court could not claim jurisdiction until the petitioners exhausted the
administrative remedy of presenting their argument to the FCC. Id. at
817. The court further noted that the Supreme Court has held that such
“exhaustion ‘serves the twin purposes of protecting administrative
agency authority and promoting judicial efficiency.’” Id. at 817–18.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit joined with the D.C. Circuit in
holding that 47 U.S.C. § 405 requires a petitioner to afford the FCC the
opportunity to pass on questions involving the backdating of FCC orders
before the petitioner may seek judicial relief. Id. at 818.
United States v. Youssef, 547 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2008)
QUESTION: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 1015(a), which imposes fines
and/or imprisonment for knowingly making false statements “relating to
naturalization, citizenship, or registry of aliens,” includes a materiality
requirement as an element of the offense. Id. at 1092–93.
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ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit first analyzed the plain language of the
statute. Id. at 1093. The court followed the 4th Circuit and held that the
plain text of 18 U.S.C. § 1015(a) does not require the false statements to
be material. Id. at 1093–94. Next, the court addressed whether the
language used in 18 U.S.C. § 1015(a) has a “settled meaning at common
law requiring proof of materiality.” Id. at 1094. The court determined
that “[n]one of the words used in 18 U.S.C. § 1015(a) have an
established meaning at common law that includes a materiality
requirement.” Id. Furthermore, the court noted that “[w]here Congress
has intended to criminalize the making of material false statements, it has
expressly done so.” Id. Therefore, the court reasoned that Congress did
not intend to impose a materiality requirement as an element of 18
U.S.C. § 1015(a) and, consequently, the court would not read such a
requirement into the statute. Id.
CONCLUSION: The court held that 18 U.S.C. § 1015(a) does not
impose a materiality requirement for false statements made “under oath,
in any case, proceeding, or matter relating to, or under, or by virtue of
any law of the United States relating to naturalization, citizenship, or
registry of aliens.” Id. at 1093–94.
Video Software Dealers Assoc. v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950 (9th
Cir. 2009)
QUESTION: Whether courts should apply a strict level of scrutiny
when reviewing video games for minors that include violent material or
apply the “variable obscenity.” Id. at 958.
ANALYSIS: The Supreme Court previously held that the standard
for reviewing acts that deal with “obscenity as to minors” is akin to the
rational basis standard. Id. at 959. The 9th Circuit thus addressed whether
they should use such a standard when reviewing video games for minors
that include violent material. Id. at 958. The 9th Circuit discussed the
resistance by the 6th, 7th, and 8th Circuits in broadening the term
obscenity “to include violent material, as well as sexually explicit
material.” Id. at 959. These circuits did not extend their obscenity
jurisprudence to violent material because the two were “distinct
categories of objectionable depiction.” Id. at 959.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit thus “declined the State’s invitation
to apply the Ginsberg rationale to materials depicting violence, and
[held] that strict scrutiny remains the applicable review standard.” Id. at
961.
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United States v. James, 556 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2009)
QUESTION: Whether “the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act
(“FJDA”) requires every charge brought against a juvenile tried as an
adult to be the subject of a juvenile transfer hearing.” Id. at 1065.
ANALYSIS: The defendant argued that the FJDA “does not allow
the trial of a juvenile as an adult on charges that have not been the
subject of a transfer hearing.” Id. at 1065. The court began its analysis by
looking at the text of the statute and found that “[o]nce the court has
determined that a juvenile should be tried as an adult, requiring an
additional hearing to determine whether related charges added later meet
the same standards would serve little purpose.” Id. at 1066. The court
further reasoned that no hearing was required “to identify the newly
added offenses or to ascertain the juvenile’s age, both currently and at
the time he allegedly committed the offenses.” Id. The court set forth the
standards for the district court to considering, including “the individual
characteristics of the juvenile himself rather than the details of the
offenses, and those characteristics were already the subject of the first
hearing. If the added charges arise from the same series of acts as the
original charges . . . the interest of justice analysis should remain
unchanged.” Id. at 1066 (internal quotation marks omitted).
CONCLUSION: The court held that “the FJDA . . . does not require
that charges added after a juvenile has been transferred to adult status be
the subject of an additional juvenile transfer hearing.” Id. at 1063.

TENTH CIRCUIT
Vallario v. Vandehey, 554 F.3d 1259 (10th Cir. 2009)
QUESTION: The applicable standard of review for an appellate
court when determining whether to grant a petition for permission to
appeal from an order granting or denying class action certification under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f). Id. at 1261–62.
ANALYSIS: The court stated that while appellate courts have
“limited capacity” to consider such interlocutory appeals, “certain
instances exist . . . in which interlocutory review of a district court’s class
certification decision is appropriate.” Id. at 1263. As there is “no rigid
test” governing the “exercise of [the court’s] discretion to grant a petition
of interlocutory review,” the 10th Circuit proffered a set of principles
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“useful in evaluating the merits of a Rule 23(f) petition.” Id. The court
enumerated three situations where interlocutory review of a district
court’s class certification order is appropriate: (1) “death knell cases,”
referring to situations in which a questionable class certification order “is
likely to force either a plaintiff or defendant to resolve the case based on
considerations independent of the merits;” (2) when there is “an interest
in facilitating the development of the law,” and (3) whether the district
court’s decision is “manifestly erroneous.” Id. The 10th Circuit reasoned
that while most cases “ripe for consideration under Rule 23(f) will
normally fall into one of these three categories,” appellate courts have
broad discretion to review such petitions, and therefore a “rule that
would clearly delineate every instance” of interlocutory review is
inappropriate. Id. at 1264.
CONCLUSION: The 10th Circuit held that when determining
whether to grant a petition for permission to appeal an order granting or
denying class action certification pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f),
appellate courts have broad discretion in granting or denying petitions for
interlocutory review, and must “exercise their best judgment” in making
such decisions rather than strictly adhering to the three categories of
cases. Id.
Brown v. Day, 555 F.3d 882 (10th Cir. 2009)
QUESTION: The appropriate test for determining “whether a state
proceeding is remedial or coercive,” so as to qualify as an ongoing state
proceeding that is “due the deference accorded by Younger abstention” in
deciding “whether a federal district court must abstain” from hearing a
case where the “federal plaintiff has previously requested a hearing and
received a final order regarding an agency’s decision to terminate
benefits.” Id. at 887–88.
ANALYSIS: The 10th Circuit referred to the test set forth by the 1st
Circuit for deciding whether the type of proceeding is remedial or
coercive. Id. at 889. The 1st Circuit test involves differentiating between
(1) “whether the federal plaintiff initiated the state proceeding of her own
volition to right a wrong inflicted by the state (a remedial proceeding) or
whether the state initiated the proceeding against her, making her
participation mandatory (a coercive proceeding)” and (2) “where the
federal plaintiff contends that the state proceeding is unlawful (coercive)
from cases where the federal plaintiff seeks a remedy for some other
state-inflicted wrong (remedial).” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 10th Circuit held that Brown’s court
administrative proceedings were “not the type of proceeding entitled to
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Younger deference” because Brown initiated the proceeding after her
benefits were terminated and there was no compulsion by the state to
participate in the proceedings. Id.
United States v. Poe, 556 F. 3d 1113 (10th Cir. 2009)
QUESTION: Whether bounty hunters constitute state actors for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment when they conduct a search in the
course of seeking out a bail-jumper. Id. at 1117.
ANALYSIS: The 10th Circuit confirmed that the Fourth Amendment
protects against “unreasonable searches and seizures by state actors.” Id.
at 1123. The court held, however, that “[w]hen a private individual
conducts a search not acting as, or in concert with, a government agent,
the Fourth Amendment is not implicated, no matter how unreasonable
the search.” Id. The court reasoned that there might be some instances
where a search by a private citizen transforms into a governmental search
thereby implicating the Fourth Amendment. Id.
The court applied a two-prong approach “to decide if a search by a
private individual constitutes state action” under the Fourth Amendment.
Id. The first prong asks “whether the government knew of and
acquiesced in the [individual’s] intrusive conduct.” Id. The second prong
considers “whether the party performing the search intended to assist law
enforcement efforts or to further his own ends.” Id. The court insisted
that both prongs must be satisfied “considering the totality of the
circumstances” for the private search to be transformed into a
government search. Id.
The 10th Circuit reasoned that if the government agent is involved
“merely as a witness . . . the after-the-fact involvement of the police does
not implicate the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 1124. Furthermore,
“involvement in the bail bonds industry is insufficient to satisfy this
inquiry.” Id. The court required “knowledge of or acquiescence in the
challenged search.” Id. Finally, the court reasoned that private conduct
will not amount to state action if the bounty hunters “had a ‘legitimate,
independent motivation’ to conduct the search,” such as financial gain.
Id.
CONCLUSION: The 10th Circuit held that “bounty hunters do not
qualify as state actors when . . . they act without the assistance of law
enforcement and for their own pecuniary interests.” Id. at 1117.
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United States v. Dozier, 555 F.3d 1136 (10th Cir. 2009)
QUESTION: Whether “the sentence imposed following the
revocation of a defendant’s probation is a prior sentence within the
meaning of U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1,” when “the conduct resulting in the
revocation of his probation is the same conduct that forms the basis of
the instant offense.” Id. at 1139 (internal quotation marks omitted).
ANALYSIS: The 10th Circuit first noted that “incarceration resulting
from a probation revocation is punishment for the original offense.” Id.
at 1140. Further, “[w]here probation is revoked based on the same
conduct forming the basis of a federal offense, the imposition of the
original sentence is attributable to the original act of conviction, [and]
not the act underlying the revocation.” Id. at 1141.
CONCLUSION: Thus, the court held that the sentence imposed
following the revocation of a defendant’s probation is a prior sentence
under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1, even when the conduct which leads to the
revocation of the defendant’s probation is the same conduct that forms
the basis of the instant offense. Id.
Teton Millwork Sales v. Schlossberg, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 2578
(10th Cir. Feb. 10, 2009)
QUESTION: Whether the Barton doctrine applies to deny a federal
court jurisdiction to hear a claim against a court appointed receiver
where the appointing court has not given permission and the plaintiff
alleges that a receiver wrongfully seized his or her assets. Id. at *6.
ANALYSIS: The general rule under the Barton doctrine states “that
before suit is brought against a receiver[,] leave of the court by which
[the receiver] was appointed must be obtained.” Id. However, “if, by
mistake or wrongfully, the receiver takes possession of property
belonging to another, such person may bring suit therefor against him
personally as a matter of right; for in such case the receiver would be
acting [outside the scope of her duties].” Id. When a plaintiff alleges that
a receiver wrongfully seized his or her assets, a federal court has
jurisdiction without permission from the appointing court. Id. at *5–6.
CONCLUSION: Thus the 10th Circuit held that if a plaintiff alleges
that a receiver wrongfully seized his or her assets, the Barton doctrine
does not bar federal jurisdiction, even without permission from the
appointing court. Id. at *6–7.
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ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Hemispherx Biopharma Inc. v. Johannesburg Consolidated
Investments, 553 F.3d 1351 (11th Cir. 2008)
QUESTION: “Whether individuals or entities without a beneficial
ownership interest in a company’s securities can nonetheless become
members of a ‘group’ within the meaning of [the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934] section 13(d)(3)” and thus are required to comply
with the reporting requirements of section 13(d)(1). Id. at 1361.
ANALYSIS: Section 13(d) requires persons owning more than five
percent of the stock of a publicly traded company, to “disclose certain
information to the issuer of the stock, the exchanges on which the stock
is traded and the SEC.” Id. at 1361. Section 13(d)(3) provides that
partnerships and other groups are considered a “person” under section
13(d), but the statute is silent on “whether beneficial ownership of stock
is required for group membership within the meaning of paragraph
(d)(3).” Id. at 1363. The 11th Circuit concluded that the purpose of
section 13(d)(3) “is to prevent persons who already have attained
beneficial ownership of some amount of an issuer’s securities from
combining to control over five percent of a class of securities, yet
ducking the reporting requirement in section 13(d)(1).” Id at 1364.
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit concluded that, “a beneficial
ownership interest in securities is necessary to become a member of a
group within the meaning of section 13(d)(3) of the Exchange Act.” Id.
at 1366.
Singh v. Attorney General, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 5248 (11th Cir.
Mar. 10, 2009)
QUESTION: Whether a state’s conviction of a minor in adult court
is considered a conviction for purposes of deportation under the
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). Id. at *6.
ANALYSIS: The 11th Circuit examined the plain language of INA §
101(a)(48)(A), which requires that “an alien who is convicted of an
aggravated felony, such as burglary, at any time after admission is
deportable.” Id. The statute defines a “conviction” as a “formal judgment
of guilt of the alien entered by a court or, if adjudication of guilt has been
withheld, where a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has
entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient
facts to warrant a finding of guilt.” Id. In following the 1st, 2nd and 9th
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Circuits, the 11th Circuit determined that “because the INA’s definition
of conviction [is] clear and unambiguous,” the court is “bound by the
state court’s determination to adjudicate the petitioner as an adult.” Id. at
*7. The court noted that Immigration and Naturalization Services need
not be bound by the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, which does not
allow for an individual to be transferred to adult court if he committed a
non-violent crime and that “if Congress had wanted the INS to follow the
[Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act] at all times, it would have so stated.”
Id.
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that an alien’s conviction as
an “adult in court is a conviction for immigration purposes, even though
he was a minor at the time.” Id. at *8.
United States v. Harrison, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 3014 (11th Cir. Feb.
19, 2009)
QUESTION: “[W]hether a § 316.1935(2) conviction qualifie[d] as a
violent felony for purposes of” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4(b)(3)(B) (“Armed
Career Criminal Act”). Id. at *4 (internal quotation marks omitted).
ANALYSIS: The court described the behavior ordinarily underlying
§ 316.1935(2) as: “(1) a law enforcement vehicle, with its siren and
lights activated, signal[ing] the motorist to stop and (2) the motorist
willfully refus[ing] or fail[ing] to stop the vehicle.” Id. at *38. The court
noted that such a crime did “not involve the same high level of risk” as
the crimes enumerated in the residual clause of § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). Id. at
*41. Furthermore, the court held that to be similar in kind to the
enumerated offenses, conduct underlying § 316.1935(2) had to be
purposeful, violent, and aggressive. Id. at *45. The court, in comparison,
held that disobeying an officer’s signal and continuing to drive without
more, such as “high speed or reckless conduct, [was] not sufficiently
aggressive and violent enough to be” similar in kind to the enumerated
Armed Career Crimes Act crimes. Id. at *45–46.
CONCLUSION: Thus, the court ruled that a § 316.1935(2) crime did
not qualify as a violent felony for the purposes of the Armed Career
Criminal Act. Id. at *47.
Belanger v. Salvation Army, 556 F.3d 1153 (11th Cir. 2009)
QUESTION: Whether a corporation constitutes a person “permitted
to be a lawful beneficiary of a pay-on-death account under section
655.82 of the Florida Statutes.” Id. at *2.
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ANALYSIS: The 11th Circuit interpreted section 655.82 in
accordance with its plain language, and because it does not include a
definition of the word person, the court looked to “related statutory
provisions” that provide such a definition. Id. at *5–6. The court found
that the definition of the term person in section 1.01(3) of the Florida
Statutes includes corporations, and therefore a beneficiary of a pay-ondeath account may be a corporation. Id. at *6–7.
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that because the context of
section 655.82 permits the use of the word “person” as defined in section
1.01(3) to include corporations, “a beneficiary of a pay-on-death account
may be a corporation.” Id. at *7.
McCloud v. Hooks, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 4125 (11th Cir. Mar. 2,
2009)
QUESTION: “[W]hether multiple charges consolidated under
Alabama Rule of Criminal Procedure 13.3 remain consolidated on appeal
when a defendant pleads guilty to one charge, is convicted by a jury on
another charge, and two separate judgments are entered against the
defendant.” Id. at *14.
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that the state trial court sentenced
McCloud separately for both of his convictions. Id. at *15. Because of
these separate sentences, the 11th Circuit found that the later sentencing
was not a “resentencing,” but related only to the second conviction. Id. at
*15–16. The court concluded that the state trial court effectively severed
the consolidated cases as a matter of law. Id. at *16. Therefore, because
the judgments were severed, the tolling periods were similarly served as
to each charge. Id.
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit concluded that the convictions
were severed as a matter of law upon sentencing and the statute of
limitations period begins tolling on the date of each charge’s respective
conviction. Id.
United States v. Louis, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 5066 (11th Cir. Feb. 27,
2009)
QUESTION: “[W]hether a federally licensed firearms dealer who
sells a firearm to a convicted felon is subject to a sentence enhancement
for abusing a position of public trust.” Id. at *1.
ANALYSIS: The court first analyzed the requirements of a position
of public trust under the sentencing guidelines statute. Id. at *9. The
court then applied the three factors required for a position of public trust
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to a federally licensed firearms dealer: “professional judgment,
discretion, and deference.” Id. at *17–18. First, the court found that to
grant a license, the federal government does not review or warrant the
professional judgment of a prospective licensee. Id. at *17. Second, the
court noted that the government “has no discretion to deny a license” if
an application meets the statutory requirements. Id. Finally, the court
found that firearms dealers have “little, if any, professional deference” as
to who they can sell firearms to. Id. at *18.
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that because none of the
factors required for a “position of public trust” pertain to a federally
licensed firearms dealer, there should be no sentencing enhancement. Id.
at *19.

